An open question for Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology

How do the real properties of a sensual object relate to the real properties of the corresponding real object in Graham Harman's Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO)? In personal writing Harman explained that "it's still in part an open question" and that "the default hypothesis would be that there is some overlap between the real qualities of the real and sensual objects, though not a total identification." Let me attempt to work out Harman's suggestion in a bit more detail. The real properties of the sensual object are linked or tied to the real properties of the corresponding real object. Moreover, the real properties of the sensual object are linked or tied to the real properties of the corresponding real object by virtue of the fact that the sensual object's real properties are derived from the real object's real properties. Indeed, the sensual object is a kind of proxy for the real object. The sensual object represents the real object within a specific context or relation, such as human perception. Thus, while the sensual object's real properties are derived from the real properties of the real object, they are not identical or isomorphic to them. The real properties of the sensual object are limited context-dependent realizations of the real object's real properties. That is to say, the sensual object's real properties are restricted realizations of the real properties of the real object for a specific context or specific relation to the real object. We therefore cannot only speak about the sensual car in comparison to the real car. We can also speak of the real engine of the sensual car in comparison to the real engine of the real car or of the real model of the sensual car in comparison to the real model of the real car. The real car thus has a real engine and is of a specific real model. So, OOO seems to bring us closer to the real car, or any other real object, than one might have initially expected.

Universal withdrawal?

Already from the title of his fascinating book Object-Oriented Ontology. A New Theory of Everything (2018) it's clear that Graham Harman considers his object-oriented ontology to be a unified theory of everything. As Harman writes: "In my view, the 'theory whose range of applicability is limitless' can only be found in philosophy, and especially in the type of philosophy called Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO)" (p. 23). According to Harman science cannot provide a theory of everything since science doesn't avoid the pitfalls of physicalism (according to which everything is physical), smallism (according to which complex composites as less real than their component parts), anti-fictionalism (according to which fictional characters do not exist), and literalism (according to which accurate literal descriptions can give us the things directly and completely). I agree with Harman that a theory of everthing can only be found in philosophy. Moreover, with perhaps the exception of anti-fictionalism, I agree with Harman that we have to avoid the aforementioned pitfalls in our search for a philosophical theory of everything.

However, there's another pitpall we must also avoid: universalism. A theory traps into the pitfall of universalism if it is committed to the existence of a contingent universally held property (i.e., a contingent property held by everything). Universalism is a pitfall to avoid because there are no contingent universally held properties, as my semantic argument shows.(*) That's why for example the theories of everything of Thales (everything is water), Heraclitus (everything is fire), Nietzsche (everything is will to power), Schopenhauer (everything is will to live), and Latour (everything is a hybrid) are untenable. And that's why for example materialism (everything is material), idealism (everything is mental) and pantheism (everything is divine) fail as well.

Now, unfortunately, Harman doesn't avoid the pitfall of universalism. First, Harman is a methodological universalist in spirit. As he writes: "In short, we expect a philosophy to tell us about the features that belong to everything [...]" (p. 55). But more importantly, his object-oriented theory of everything falls prey to universalism. On Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology, all objects have an interior that remains forever hidden to all other objects. So, all objects withdraw from all other objects. This does not only apply to all real objects, but also to all sensual objects. For each sensual object is hidden to everything that's not its observer, while its real qualities, and thus the sensual object itself, withdraws from its observer as well. Harman is thus committed to 'withdrawal' being a universally held property. Since 'withdrawal' is also a contingent property (e.g., it does not follow from the laws of logic that all objects withdraw from all other objects), Harman's thesis of universal withdrawal is a form of universalism, rendering his object-oriented ontology in its current form untenable. There are objects that do not withdraw from all other objects.

(*) Let me provide a concise formulation of my semantic argument. If two simple or primitive terms (i.e., terms having unanalysable meanings) have the same reference, then they have the same meaning. From this it follows that there are no contingent universally held properties. For suppose there is a contingent universally held property. Its reference is thus everything that exists. Now, that property is a conjunction of simple terms all having the same reference and thus also the same meaning as the simple term 'exists'. The alleged contingent universally held property is therefore 'existence'. But ‘existence’ is not a contingent property, so we arrive at a contradiction. Hence, there are no contingent universally held properties.

Dual forms in metaphysics

Suppose that in true metaphysical propositions the concept of ‘object’ and ‘relation’ are convertible, so that for each true metaphysical proposition about objects and relations, there is a dual propositional form that holds as well. For example, the true dual form of “Objects participate into relations” would be “Relations bind to objects”. In that case the conclusion of my semantic argument (“No relation binds a quality to all objects”) would be the dual of Graham Harman’s core premise of his object-oriented ontology (“No object reveals its quality to all relations”).

Object-oriented correlationism

On Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology, all objects withdraw from each other. Objects have an inner depth or essence that is not exhausted or disclosed by their relations to other objects. Universal withdrawal of objects is the core claim of Harman's object-oriented ontology. Now, Harman is a metaphysical realist. He thus construes his object-oriented ontology as a metaphysics of the absolute or reality in itself. He believes that the core claims of his object-oriented ontology are justified as claims about how the world is in itself. But what if correlationism is irrefutable and therefore inevitable? In that case, Harman may still defend his object-oriented ontology as a metaphysics posited within the correlationist circle and thus within the context of how the world is for us instead of how it is in itself. By doing so he would become an adherent of what we could refer to as object-oriented correlationism (OOC).

In fact, many of Graham's core object-oriented ontology theses - such as that there are multiple objects, that we have to make a distinction between objects and qualities, that there are real and sensual objects and real and sensual qualities, that objects maintain a degree of autonomy and can thus not be reduced to their relations, and that there corresponds exactly one real object to each sensual object of ordinary experience (e.g., a real hammer compared to a sensual hammer, a real table compared to a sensual table, and a real bike compared to a sensual bike) - are epistemically reasonable and defensible as claims within the correlationist circle, that is, as claims about how reality is for us as human beings, whereas these claims are not justifiable as claims about how reality is in itself. For on correlationism no claim at all can be epistemically justitied as claim about the absolute or the 'in itself'.

Harman maintains though that correlationists assume a strict division between humans on the one side and non-humans on the other side. He considers it utterly implausible that human beings deserve to fill up a full half of philosophy. But this critique of correlationism is misconceived. For correlationists do not introduce an implausible taxonomy between human thought and everything else within the realm of objects. They do not allow humans to fill up fifty per cent of ontology. Correlationists do not introduce a horizontal split between humans and all other objects. They introduce instead a vertical distinction between the transcendental level of the human conditions of knowledge of objects and the object level of the objects of human knowledge. For correlationists object-oriented metaphysics resides solely at the object level and thus not at the transcendental level. At the object level an object-oriented correlationist can initially posit any flat ontology that he or she wants to pick as his or her point of departure. There is on correlationism no need at all for a horizontal dogmatic split between humans and non-humans at the level of objects. The human conditions of knowledge only appear vertically at the transcendental level of knowledge of objects and not within the world of objects we perceive and think and speak about. So, as said, all core theses of Harman's object-oriented ontology, including his initial flat ontology, can be posited and reasonably defended - in fact, on correlationism only be posited and reasonably defended - within the correlationist circle. That is to say, they can only be posited and reasonably defended within the-world-as-it-is-for-us or within the world of objects of human knowledge.