Philosophers advocating a flat ontology are motivated by two different goals. First, they aim to accept as an object almost any candidate put forward. This results in a proliferation of many different kinds of objects, such as tables, chairs, atoms, strings, persons, cities, countries, representations, thoughts, feelings, qualities, events, facts, relations, and so on. Second, they desire to prevent any hierarchy between objects. No object should be more or less an object than any other object. In other words, there are no objects that are more fundamental or more privileged than others.
Both goals correspond to two different dimensions of any proposed flat ontology, namely its breath (scope) and its depth (hierarchy). The flattest ontology should have a maximal scope and zero depth. But then one given flat ontology can actually be more or less flat than another suggested one. Your flat ontology could be flatter than mine, just in case yours allows for more different types of objects or includes less hierarchical levels between objects.
Take quantificationalists such as Frege, Russell and Quine. According to them there are no things that do not exist. Saying this refers to the second dimension of flatness. For they do not want to introduce different levels of objects, that is to say, a hierarchy between objects that actually exist and objects that merely are but do not exist. However, with respect to the first dimension of flatness their ontology is in fact not flat at all. The reason for this is that they exclude many candidates for being an object. For example, they surely do not allow possibilia and impossibilia to be objects.
Contrary to quantificationalists, neo-Meinongians advocate a flat ontology in the first sense. For they want to count possibilia and even impossibilia as genuine objects, leading to a wide range of different kinds of objects. Yet, with respect to the second dimension they are in fact not advocating a flat ontology at all. The reason for this is that they accept a hierarchy between objects, namely between those that actually exist and those that just be but don't exist.
So neither quantificationalists such as Frege, Russell and Quine, nor neo-Meinongians are true advocates of a flat ontology. An example of a true flat ontologist would be Tristan Garcia. In the first part of his fascinating book Form and Object. A treatise on things he accepts almost* every candidate for being a thing, while at the same time preventing any hierarchy between things. Anything is a thing, no matter what. Everything is equally something. No more, no less.
(*) "The world is precisely that which is not some-thing. It hardly has any other determination" (T. Garcia, Form and Object, p. 86)
Posts tonen met het label flat ontology. Alle posts tonen
Posts tonen met het label flat ontology. Alle posts tonen
woensdag 28 januari 2015
maandag 17 februari 2014
VU Seminar on Speculative Realism
This year I shall teach a VU course on Speculative Realism. Speculative Realism is a growing and fascinating movement within contemporary philosophy. The course has the form of a seminar. Below I provide a short outline of its contents. Those interested in attending can contact me for further information.
Post-Kantian critical philosophy has focused almost exclusively on discourse and consciousness as what constitutes reality. Reality appeared only as the correlate of language or thought. Yet, in recent years one can detect a new development within philosophical thought. By contrast with the focus of post-Kantian critical philosophy on discourse and consciousness, a number of philosophers within the existential and phenomenological tradition turned again towards reality in itself. This movement is known as Speculative Realism.
The adjective speculative might suggest a return to pre-Kantian dogmatic philosophy. This is however not the case. Speculative realist thinkers purport to think reality in itself again, without falling back to pre-critical unreflective thought.
Speculative realists share a strong resistance to post-Kantian philosophies of human finitude. They reject the Kantian idea that we only have access to the correlation or interplay between thinking and being, and never to one of them considered apart from the other.
Further, these thinkers want to overcome the Kantian presumption that our human access to reality is somehow privileged. The target of philosophical reflection is thus shifted away again from the thought-world correlate.
Apart from these commonalities, there are important differences between leading speculative realists. Core members within speculative realism are Quentin Meillassoux (defending speculative materialism), Graham Harman and Levy Bryant (defending object oriented ontology), and Tristan Garcia (defending a flat ontology).
The objective of the seminar is to gain clear insight into the various positions within speculative realism and to be able to critically assess and compare these views. We shall explore together a number of fundamental texts that are generally considered to be representative of speculative realist thought and which founded the school of speculative realism. Participants are expected to actively participate by contributing to the discussion and giving a talk.
Literature includes (but is not limited to) selected chapters from After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency by Quentin Meillassoux; 'The Current State of Speculative Realism’ in Speculations, ‘Meillassoux’s Virtual Future’ in Continent, and ‘The Road to Objects’ in Continent by Graham Harman; selected essays from The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman; and selected chapters from Form and Object: A Treatise on Things by Tristan Garcia.
Post-Kantian critical philosophy has focused almost exclusively on discourse and consciousness as what constitutes reality. Reality appeared only as the correlate of language or thought. Yet, in recent years one can detect a new development within philosophical thought. By contrast with the focus of post-Kantian critical philosophy on discourse and consciousness, a number of philosophers within the existential and phenomenological tradition turned again towards reality in itself. This movement is known as Speculative Realism.
The adjective speculative might suggest a return to pre-Kantian dogmatic philosophy. This is however not the case. Speculative realist thinkers purport to think reality in itself again, without falling back to pre-critical unreflective thought.
Speculative realists share a strong resistance to post-Kantian philosophies of human finitude. They reject the Kantian idea that we only have access to the correlation or interplay between thinking and being, and never to one of them considered apart from the other.
Further, these thinkers want to overcome the Kantian presumption that our human access to reality is somehow privileged. The target of philosophical reflection is thus shifted away again from the thought-world correlate.
Apart from these commonalities, there are important differences between leading speculative realists. Core members within speculative realism are Quentin Meillassoux (defending speculative materialism), Graham Harman and Levy Bryant (defending object oriented ontology), and Tristan Garcia (defending a flat ontology).
The objective of the seminar is to gain clear insight into the various positions within speculative realism and to be able to critically assess and compare these views. We shall explore together a number of fundamental texts that are generally considered to be representative of speculative realist thought and which founded the school of speculative realism. Participants are expected to actively participate by contributing to the discussion and giving a talk.
Literature includes (but is not limited to) selected chapters from After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency by Quentin Meillassoux; 'The Current State of Speculative Realism’ in Speculations, ‘Meillassoux’s Virtual Future’ in Continent, and ‘The Road to Objects’ in Continent by Graham Harman; selected essays from The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman; and selected chapters from Form and Object: A Treatise on Things by Tristan Garcia.
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