Garcia's differenties

Tristan Garcia spreekt in zijn Form and Object. A Treatise of Things over het ding als de differentie tussen dat wat het ding omvat en dat wat door het ding omvat wordt, tussen de omgeving waarin het ding is opgenomen en de componenten waaruit het ding bestaat. Maar wat bedoelt hij hier precies mee? Mijns inziens kunnen we zijn gebruik van het concept 'differentie' op drie onderling verschillende manieren interpreteren.

Volgens de eerste interpretatie moet 'differentie' worden opgevat als een operatie die analoog is aan de operatie van het berekenen van het arithmetisch verschil tussen twee rekenkundige kwantiteiten. Het ding is als de differentie van zijn omgeving en zijn componenten het resultaat van het (naar analogie met de wiskunde) bepalen van het verschil tussen beiden. We moeten de een op mathematische wijze van de ander afhalen. Dit is de interpretatie waarvan ik zelf uitga in mijn repliek op Garcia. Ook Graham Harman kiest voor deze interpretatie in zijn bespreking van Garcia's boek.

De tweede interpretatie begrijpt 'differentie' daarentegen als relatie, interactie of wisselwerking. Het ding is dan als differentie tussen omgeving en componenten de relatie of de wisselwerking tussen enerzijds de omgeving waarin het ding is opgenomen en anderzijds de componenten waaruit het ding bestaat. Het ding is deze interactie. Een dergelijke invulling van 'differentie' als wisselwerking vinden we ook in Levi Bryants differentiële ontologie.

Volgens de derde interpretatie is het ding echter de grens of de overgang tussen omgeving en componenten. Het ding is uitgaande van deze interpretatie de rand of scheidingslijn waarop beiden elkaar raken en elkaar ontmoeten. Het ding is de plaats waarop 'het buiten' van de omgeving overgaat in 'het binnen' van de componenten.

De tweede en derde interpretatie hebben met elkaar gemeen dat er zonder omgeving geen ding kan zijn. Zonder omgeving is er immers geen interactie tussen omgeving en componenten of overgang van omgeving naar componenten. De omgeving is dus constitutief voor het bestaan van het ding. En hetzelfde geldt voor de componenten. Er kan immers evenmin een wisselwerking of grens tussen omgeving en componenten zijn als de componenten ontbreken.

Uit de tweede en derde interpretatie volgt dat de wereld niet kan bestaan. De wereld heeft als het allesomvattende namelijk geen omgeving waarin het is opgenomen.* Inmiddels ben ik geneigd de tweede of de derde interpretatie als meest eigenlijk of adequaat te beschouwen. Dit heeft uiteraard gevolgen voor mijn eerdergenoemde repliek. Daarin vertrek ik immers vanuit de eerste interpretatie.

[*] Evenmin kunnen er (mereologische) atomen bestaan. Atomen bevatten immers geen componenten.

Speculative Realism and First Causes

According to Tristan Garcia each thing is constituted by the relation between that-which-is-in-the-thing and that-in-which-the-thing is. That is to say, each thing is constituted by the relation between its components and its environment. But then things are partially constituted by their environment. From this is follows that a first cause cannot exist. For, a first cause is the (in)direct cause of its environment and therefore not partially constituted by it.

Markus Gabriel has it that to exist is to exist in a context. This entails as well that a first cause does not exist. For if there is a first cause, it exists in some context. This context is caused by the first cause. At the same time the context must be ontologically prior to the first cause, since without this context the first cause doesn't exist. But this is impossible, since nothing is ontologically prior to its cause.

Are Garcia's and Gabriel's ontological claims about the nature of thinghood convincing? If so, interesting arguments from speculative realism against the existence of a first cause are obtained. It seems to me though that both ontologies face serious problems. Some of these I have disucssed elsewhere. And I will continue to do so.

True Flatness: A Response to Tristan Garcia

Yesterday I responded to Tristan Garcia at the COIN UvA Future of Realism Colloquium. My response is available here on my website. Garcia gave a comprehensive reply in which he mentioned amongst others that he is considering the application of mathematical category theory to address what I raised in my response. Afterwards Garcia promised me to come back to this. I really enjoyed our discussion and I am looking forward to the further development of his project. Moreover, I believe that the whole colloquium and the social event afterwards was a great success.

True flatness

Philosophers advocating a flat ontology are motivated by two different goals. First, they aim to accept as an object almost any candidate put forward. This results in a proliferation of many different kinds of objects, such as tables, chairs, atoms, strings, persons, cities, countries, representations, thoughts, feelings, qualities, events, facts, relations, and so on. Second, they desire to prevent any hierarchy between objects. No object should be more or less an object than any other object. In other words, there are no objects that are more fundamental or more privileged than others.

Both goals correspond to two different dimensions of any proposed flat ontology, namely its breath (scope) and its depth (hierarchy). The flattest ontology should have a maximal scope and zero depth. But then one given flat ontology can actually be more or less flat than another suggested one. Your flat ontology could be flatter than mine, just in case yours allows for more different types of objects or includes less hierarchical levels between objects.

Take quantificationalists such as Frege, Russell and Quine. According to them there are no things that do not exist. Saying this refers to the second dimension of flatness. For they do not want to introduce different levels of objects, that is to say, a hierarchy between objects that actually exist and objects that merely are but do not exist. However, with respect to the first dimension of flatness their ontology is in fact not flat at all. The reason for this is that they exclude many candidates for being an object. For example, they surely do not allow possibilia and impossibilia to be objects.

Contrary to quantificationalists, neo-Meinongians advocate a flat ontology in the first sense. For they want to count possibilia and even impossibilia as genuine objects, leading to a wide range of different kinds of objects. Yet, with respect to the second dimension they are in fact not advocating a flat ontology at all. The reason for this is that they accept a hierarchy between objects, namely between those that actually exist and those that just be but don't exist.

So neither quantificationalists such as Frege, Russell and Quine, nor neo-Meinongians are true advocates of a flat ontology. An example of a true flat ontologist would be Tristan Garcia. In the first part of his fascinating book Form and Object. A treatise on things he accepts almost* every candidate for being a thing, while at the same time preventing any hierarchy between things. Anything is a thing, no matter what. Everything is equally something. No more, no less.

(*) "The world is precisely that which is not some-thing. It hardly has any other determination" (T. Garcia, Form and Object, p. 86)

VU Seminar on Speculative Realism

This year I shall teach a VU course on Speculative Realism. Speculative Realism is a growing and fascinating movement within contemporary philosophy. The course has the form of a seminar. Below I provide a short outline of its contents. Those interested in attending can contact me for further information.

Post-Kantian critical philosophy has focused almost exclusively on discourse and consciousness as what constitutes reality. Reality appeared only as the correlate of language or thought. Yet, in recent years one can detect a new development within philosophical thought. By contrast with the focus of post-Kantian critical philosophy on discourse and consciousness, a number of philosophers within the existential and phenomenological tradition turned again towards reality in itself. This movement is known as Speculative Realism.

The adjective speculative might suggest a return to pre-Kantian dogmatic philosophy. This is however not the case. Speculative realist thinkers purport to think reality in itself again, without falling back to pre-critical unreflective thought.

Speculative realists share a strong resistance to post-Kantian philosophies of human finitude. They reject the Kantian idea that we only have access to the correlation or interplay between thinking and being, and never to one of them considered apart from the other.

Further, these thinkers want to overcome the Kantian presumption that our human access to reality is somehow privileged. The target of philosophical reflection is thus shifted away again from the thought-world correlate.

Apart from these commonalities, there are important differences between leading speculative realists. Core members within speculative realism are Quentin Meillassoux (defending speculative materialism), Graham Harman and Levy Bryant (defending object oriented ontology), and Tristan Garcia (defending a flat ontology).

The objective of the seminar is to gain clear insight into the various positions within speculative realism and to be able to critically assess and compare these views. We shall explore together a number of fundamental texts that are generally considered to be representative of speculative realist thought and which founded the school of speculative realism. Participants are expected to actively participate by contributing to the discussion and giving a talk.

Literature includes (but is not limited to) selected chapters from After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency by Quentin Meillassoux; 'The Current State of Speculative Realism’ in Speculations, ‘Meillassoux’s Virtual Future’ in Continent, and ‘The Road to Objects’ in Continent by Graham Harman; selected essays from The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman; and selected chapters from Form and Object: A Treatise on Things by Tristan Garcia.

Tristan Garcia

Last Saturday there was a debate at OT301 in Amsterdam between the French philosopher Tristan Garcia and the American philosopher Graham Harman. A transcript will be produced, as Harman mentions on his blog. It was something. Many people, ’70 type of underground scene, darkened room and a few spotlights. As if Foucault was visiting us. Garcia’s performance fascinated me. And I’m not really sure why. He might have new profound thoughts about ontology. I will surely check his work. Of course I should elaborate a bit more on why he made me curious enough to further explore his philosophical thinking. And indeed, I could try to reflect on some of his moving statements, such as “Anything is something, no matter what”, “Anything is something, no less, no more”, “The thing is never in-itself, but outside of itself” and “To be is not to comprise, and to comprise is not to be”. But I can’t really. Garcia was quite hard to grasp, occasionally he even seemed unintelligible. Nevertheless I did sense that he is on to something. I saw it, in his way of speaking. I saw it in his eyes. He writes novels as well I was told afterwards. Literature and ontology. Like Sartre, a young Sartre.