zondag 17 maart 2024

Dual forms in metaphysics

Suppose that in true metaphysical propositions the concept of ‘object’ and ‘relation’ are convertible, so that for each true metaphysical proposition about objects and relations, there is a dual propositional form that holds as well. For example, the true dual form of “Objects participate into relations” would be “Relations bind to objects”. In that case the conclusion of my semantic argument (“No relation binds a quality to all objects”) would be the dual of Graham Harman’s core premise of his object-oriented ontology (“No object reveals its quality to all relations”).

1 opmerking:

George vd Velden zei

The idea of 'objects' and 'relations' being convertible in metaphysical propositions typically transcends empirical observation. It operates at a level of abstraction that does not easily lend itself to direct testing or observation in a scientific sense. Therefore, from a scientific standpoint, this idea lacks a clear pathway to empirical verification.

The terms 'objects' and 'relations' in metaphysics are broad and can encompass a wide range of entities and connections, from the physical to the abstract. Without clear, operational definitions, these concepts become difficult to analyze or discuss within a scientific context, which may lead to ambiguities and misunderstandings when attempting to apply scientific methodology to these ideas.

The convertibility of 'objects' and 'relations' in metaphysical propositions is a highly abstract and philosophical concept. It operates within a framework that is not easily subjected to falsification because it doesn't make specific, testable predictions about observable phenomena.

As such, your blog makes for an interesting philosophical exercise but it does little to further our understanding of the world we live in.