dinsdag 23 februari 2016
It's metaphysically impossible to be alone (II)
In my previous post I explained that the conclusion of my semantic argument entails that it's metaphysically impossible to be the only object in the world. One might argue that this swift consequence is counterintuitive. Isn't it highly implausible that there are no possible worlds that contain only one object? No, it isn't. Take some possible world w. Since total nothingness is metaphysically impossible, there exists an object in w. This object is plausibly either a piece of matter, a mind or a piece of information. If it's material, it exists in space and time. Given that space or time or parts thereof have objecthood, w contains more than one object. If it's a mind, w also contains more than one object. For the mental contents of a mind count reasonably as mental objects. Finally, if the object is a piece of information, then it is discursive and therefore composed of multiple information elements. But then again w contains more than one object. So in all cases w contains more than one object. Since w was arbitrarily chosen, there are no possible worlds that contain only one object. Said consequence of my semantic argument thus isn't implausible.