An argument against Molinism

The sixteenth century theologian Luis de Molina developed a metaphysical perspective according to which God knows, though He has no control over, contingent truths about how any individual would freely choose to act in any situation, even if the person never encounters that situation (Flint, 1998). The Molinist account explains how Divine providence can be compatible with libertarian freedom. Now, I take it that Molinism is untenable. Consider the argument below.

Suppose Molinism is true. In that case there is at least one true counterfactual of creaturely freedom, say {S, C, A}. That is to say, it is true that subject S in circumstances C will freely perform action A. Now, since S is a libertarian free agent, S could decide not to do A in C. Thus S could bring it about that {S, C, A} is false. Hence, S could bring it about that {S, C, A} is both true and false. But this is impossible. Nobody, free or not, can bring it about that a manifest logical contradiction obtains. Therefore we have to conclude that Molinism is false.

Or, alternatively: If Molinism is true then God believes at least one counterfactual of creaturely freedom, say {S, C, A}. Since S is free, S could bring it about that {S, C, A} is false (see above). But this is impossible. Nobody, free or not, can bring it about that God believes a falsehood. Therefore Molinism is false.

References
Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University, 1998