zaterdag 22 juni 2024
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as a Digital Metaphysics
The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and his teacher Russell where both logical atomists. On logical atomism, the world consists of logically describable facts composed of elementary or atomic facts. A Tractarian world, though, requires fewer atomic facts than a Russellian world. Here's an example to illustrate this. Suppose reality consists of precisely one colorable thing, t, that can possess one of sixteen different colors G, B, R and so on. To model the possible worlds, Russell would need sixteen atomic facts denoted by atomic propositions such as Gt, Bt, and Rt. These facts are not logically independent, as the truth of Gt, for example, entails the falsehood of Bt. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, needs only four atomic facts to model reality, namely four simple objects or bits being 'on'. Since each of these four atomic facts can be actual or not, we arrive at 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 16 possible worlds in each of which the colorable thing t has precisely one of those sixteen different colors. Moreover, Wittgenstein's four atomic facts are logically independent from each other since each of them can be actual or not while the rest can remain the same. However, Wittgenstein pays both an ontological and epistemic price for obtaining modeling efficiency and logical independence. Ontologically, he needs four simple objects instead of just one colorable thing as Russell does. Epistemically, those four simple objects and corresponding four atomic facts are quite mysterious compared to Russell's rather straightforward sixteen atomic facts. The four simple objects are not colorable themselves. What are they? It's no surprise that, in his Tractatus, Wittgenstein never explains what the simple objects of the world amount to. Yet, the reference to bits in the above example suggests that a Tractarian world is ultimately akin to the binary structure of a digital information system. On a Tractarian metaphysics, reality appears to be analogous to software that operates within a computer. This implies that Wittgenstein may have understood the world we inhabit as being isomorphic to a virtual field of binary information. A digital-like structure of reality posits an intriguing vision of the world. Wittgenstein's Tractatus can be seen as a predecessor to our digital age. The idea of simple objects functioning like binary bits grounds a digital metaphysics, suggesting a binary reality that can be understood in terms of digital information long before the advent of modern computing.
maandag 10 juni 2024
A new argument for God's existence from non-bruteness
Abstract
I propose a new argument for God's existence. It departs from the premise that there must be an ultimate reason for why this world exists, even though we as human beings may never know it. The argument then explores what characteristics such an ultimate reason must have. First, it needs to be self-evident in an absolute sense (i.e., its self-evidence needs to transcend all possible worlds - even the empty one) in order for it to be truly an ultimate reason. Second, by virtue of the nature of self-evidence, it must be at least conceivable. More specifically, something that’s self-evident in an absolute sense must be conceivable as being self-evident in an absolute sense. As I argue, only a being that is itself positioned at the absolute and thus has an absolute point of view can conceive of something as being self-evident in an absolute sense. Thus, an absolute mind exists. Such a mind is properly referred to as God. Surely, the content of this ultimate reason (which may, as said, for us humans be unknowable), would then also have to entail that God exists.
The argument
In what follows I propose a new argument for the existence of God. I call it the argument from non-bruteness. The fact that there is being and that it has the fundamental structure it has cannot be merely a brute fact. There must be some ultimate explanation for why there is being and why it has the fundamental characteristics it has. Such an explanation must be a regress-of-explanation-ender. Otherwise, it is not an ultimate explanation. It must thus be self-evident in-and-of-itself. That is to say, it must be self-evident regardless of which non-empty or empty possible world is actual. Hence, it must be self-evident in an absolute sense. But it can only be self-evident in an absolute sense if it is conceived to be self-evident in an absolute sense. Indeed, for something to be self-evident in an absolute sense, it must be exemplified as being self-evident in an absolute sense. But that requires it to be conceived as self-evident in an absolute sense. Without such conceiving the ultimate explanation is not actualized as self-evident in an absolute sense. Since only a conscious mind that is itself positioned at the absolute and thus has an absolute perspective can conceive of the ultimate explanation as being self-evident in an absolute sense, it follows that there exists a conscious mind that is positioned at the absolute and that has an absolute perspective. Now, a mind positioned at the absolute and having an absolute perspective is properly referred to as God. Hence, God exists.
Absolute and conditional perspectives
Here, an absolute perspective is what’s often also referred to as an Archimedean point of view: a perspective that transcends all contingent points of view. Sometimes it’s called a God’s eye view since indeed only an absolute being properly referred to as 'God' could have such a wholly unconstraint perspective. Let me unpack a bit the relevant step of the argument. Suppose the content of the ultimate absolute self-evident explanation of the world is C. Now, surely, say, a human being might very well be able to grasp content C if confronted with C. That’s not the issue. And, surely, a human being might very well be able to grasp content C as being self-evident for him or her as a human being. That’s not the issue either. But to grasp C as being self-evident not merely from our human point of view, but from the absolute point of view, requires something human beings lack, namely an absolute viewpoint. To hold that an explanation is self-evident in an absolute sense, means that it is self-evident regardless of any particular partial perspective or context. It is thus not contingent on specific conditions. You and I and other human beings are inherently limited in our perspective. Our human cognitive capacities are bound by our specific contingent cognitive faculties. Only if you stand in the shoes of an absolute being, can you experience whether or not something is self-evident from the absolute point of view. After all, for all we know something that’s self-evident from the human point of view might not be self-evident from the absolute point of view and vice versa. We can never step outside of our human condition and into the shoes of an absolute being. So we will never know whether what’s humanly self-evident is also absolutely self-evident or the other way around. Even though we can recognize certain propositions as being self-evident from our viewpoint, we cannot claim that our recognition is absolute. Our perspective is always conditional and partial. Indeed, only an absolute mind having an absolute point of view could conceive of something as being self-evident in an absolute sense, which is precisely what I claim as part of my argument.
An objection
Let me consider an objection to the argument. One may respond that the ultimate explanation of being does not have to be actualized in the understanding of a conscious mind because it would be sufficient for such an explanation to remain merely potential. Yet, even if the ultimate explanation of the world is not actualized, it must, by virtue of being an explanation, still be actualizable. That is to say, even if it is not conceived by a conscious mind, it must still be conceivable by some actually existing conscious mind. For just as a hand that cannot be connected to a body is not truly a hand, an explanation that cannot be conceived is not truly an explanation. Epistemic explanations, like semantic meanings, are fundamentally relational. Therefore, there exists a conscious mind that is able to conceive and thereby actualize the ultimate explanation of the world. As argued above, the ultimate explanation is self-evident in an absolute sense. Otherwise, it is not an ultimate explanation. But how can said mind be able to grasp or comprehend something as self-evident in an absolute sense? It is only able to understand something as self-evident in an absolute sense if it is an absolute mind having an absolute perspective. Again, it follows that God exists.
An improvement
It's important to point out that I can further improve my argument by limiting myself to the mere metaphysical possibility of there being a conscious being that conceives of the ultimate explanation as being self-evident. Let me explain. If an explanation is truly self-evident, then it’s reasonable to hold that it must at least be metaphysically possibly conceivable as being indeed self-evident. If it’s metaphysically impossible for that explanation to be conceived as being self-evident, it’s not genuinely self-evident. Being at least possibly conceived as being self-evident seems to be part of the very nature of self-evidence. Being self-evident refers to a reflextive stance towards its content. This line of reasoning is indeed already sufficient for my argument. For only a possible absolute being having an absolute perspective would be able to conceive of the absolute self-evident explanation of the world as being absolutely self-evident. So it follows that there exists possibly an absolute mind having an absolute perspective. There is in other words a possible world in which such an absolute being exists. Since this absolute mind is not dependent on anything else for its existence and thus uncaused, it exists in all possible worlds - including the actual world. So this absolute being actually exists. Hence it follows again that God exists.
Dialectical implications
The first premise of my argument is the non-bruteness premise. One may reject this premise, of course. That is to say, one may not accept that there must be some ultimate explanation of the world. That is why I have called my argument the argument from non-bruteness. The argument shows that to the extent that it is plausible that there is an ultimate explanation for why this world exists, it is plausible that God exists. And many do believe that there is plausibly some ultimate explanation of the world. What my argument shows is that if there is some ultimate explanation of reality, it follows that theism is true. Thus, the argument effectively rules out non-theistic ultimate explanations. Therefore, if my argument is successful, then the atheist has to maintain that there is no ultimate explanation of the world - which for many atheists may not be a desirable position to be in.
The argument and world-for-us epistemology
Those who are familiar with my world-for-us epistemology may wonder how my new argument relates to it. On my theory of knowledge we are doing metaphysics within the-world-for-us. So, all our claims are always already claims within the-world-for-us. The-world-in-itself is for us inescapably unknowable. This is the first sense of saying that the absolute is unknowable. We will never be able to transcend the-world-for-us. We will never be able to grasp the-world-in-itself. We inevitably do all our projects, including metaphysics, within the-world-for-us. Hence, a successful metaphysical argument for God’s existence leads us towards a God within the-world-for-us. That is to say, it leads us towards a God-for-us. For, again, such an argument doesn’t give us any insight in the-world-in-itself.
Normally I don’t refer to this meta-epistemic level and just engage in doing metaphysics. Now, I maintain that the claim that there must be some absolute self-evident ultimate explanation of the world is justified (and thus only justified) as a claim about or within the-world-for-us. It’s a claim internal to the-world-for-us. For it’s not justified as a claim about the-world-in-itself.
Moreover, the claim that we are not able to access this absolute self-evident ultimate explanation is also only justified as a claim about or within the-world-for-us. This is the second sense of saying that we cannot know the absolute. The second sense refers to a characteristic within the-world-for-us, whereas the first sense refers to the interplay between the-world-for-us and the-world-in-itself.
There are good arguments for God’s existence within the-world-for-us. So within the-world-for-us we can know that God exists. And God is within the-world-for-us of course not to be equated with the absolute self-evident ultimate explanation. God is not some absolute self-evident truth. Indeed, God is a conscious being in the-world-for-us that is the first cause of everything in the-world-for-us. Thus God is, of course, not equal to the ultimate absolute self-evident explanation in the-world-for-us. Conscious beings may know explanations, but are not themselves explanations. Hence, there’s no contradiction between my new argument and my world-for-us epistemology. The three claims below can all be coherently affirmed simultaneously.
1. We cannot know anything about the-world-in-itself (i.e., the first sense of saying that the absolute is unknowable).
2. The proposition “There is an ultimate absolute self-evident explanation of the world and we are not able to know this explanation” is justified as a claim about or within the-world-for-us (i.e., the second sense of saying that the absolute is unknowable).
3. The proposition “God exists” is justified as a claim about or within the-world-for-us.
It’s an interesting question within the-world-for-us how the ultimate absolute self-evident explanation of the world within the-world-for-us relates to God within the-world-for-us. With respect to how things are within the-world-for-us, my new argument suggests not only that God knows the ultimate absolute self-evident explanation of the world, but it also suggests that the mere fact that this explanation exists necessitates God’s existence, even without considering the specific content of the explanation. Of course, in this case, the specific content of the absolute ultimate explanation of the world also has to entail Gods existence.
I propose a new argument for God's existence. It departs from the premise that there must be an ultimate reason for why this world exists, even though we as human beings may never know it. The argument then explores what characteristics such an ultimate reason must have. First, it needs to be self-evident in an absolute sense (i.e., its self-evidence needs to transcend all possible worlds - even the empty one) in order for it to be truly an ultimate reason. Second, by virtue of the nature of self-evidence, it must be at least conceivable. More specifically, something that’s self-evident in an absolute sense must be conceivable as being self-evident in an absolute sense. As I argue, only a being that is itself positioned at the absolute and thus has an absolute point of view can conceive of something as being self-evident in an absolute sense. Thus, an absolute mind exists. Such a mind is properly referred to as God. Surely, the content of this ultimate reason (which may, as said, for us humans be unknowable), would then also have to entail that God exists.
The argument
In what follows I propose a new argument for the existence of God. I call it the argument from non-bruteness. The fact that there is being and that it has the fundamental structure it has cannot be merely a brute fact. There must be some ultimate explanation for why there is being and why it has the fundamental characteristics it has. Such an explanation must be a regress-of-explanation-ender. Otherwise, it is not an ultimate explanation. It must thus be self-evident in-and-of-itself. That is to say, it must be self-evident regardless of which non-empty or empty possible world is actual. Hence, it must be self-evident in an absolute sense. But it can only be self-evident in an absolute sense if it is conceived to be self-evident in an absolute sense. Indeed, for something to be self-evident in an absolute sense, it must be exemplified as being self-evident in an absolute sense. But that requires it to be conceived as self-evident in an absolute sense. Without such conceiving the ultimate explanation is not actualized as self-evident in an absolute sense. Since only a conscious mind that is itself positioned at the absolute and thus has an absolute perspective can conceive of the ultimate explanation as being self-evident in an absolute sense, it follows that there exists a conscious mind that is positioned at the absolute and that has an absolute perspective. Now, a mind positioned at the absolute and having an absolute perspective is properly referred to as God. Hence, God exists.
Absolute and conditional perspectives
Here, an absolute perspective is what’s often also referred to as an Archimedean point of view: a perspective that transcends all contingent points of view. Sometimes it’s called a God’s eye view since indeed only an absolute being properly referred to as 'God' could have such a wholly unconstraint perspective. Let me unpack a bit the relevant step of the argument. Suppose the content of the ultimate absolute self-evident explanation of the world is C. Now, surely, say, a human being might very well be able to grasp content C if confronted with C. That’s not the issue. And, surely, a human being might very well be able to grasp content C as being self-evident for him or her as a human being. That’s not the issue either. But to grasp C as being self-evident not merely from our human point of view, but from the absolute point of view, requires something human beings lack, namely an absolute viewpoint. To hold that an explanation is self-evident in an absolute sense, means that it is self-evident regardless of any particular partial perspective or context. It is thus not contingent on specific conditions. You and I and other human beings are inherently limited in our perspective. Our human cognitive capacities are bound by our specific contingent cognitive faculties. Only if you stand in the shoes of an absolute being, can you experience whether or not something is self-evident from the absolute point of view. After all, for all we know something that’s self-evident from the human point of view might not be self-evident from the absolute point of view and vice versa. We can never step outside of our human condition and into the shoes of an absolute being. So we will never know whether what’s humanly self-evident is also absolutely self-evident or the other way around. Even though we can recognize certain propositions as being self-evident from our viewpoint, we cannot claim that our recognition is absolute. Our perspective is always conditional and partial. Indeed, only an absolute mind having an absolute point of view could conceive of something as being self-evident in an absolute sense, which is precisely what I claim as part of my argument.
An objection
Let me consider an objection to the argument. One may respond that the ultimate explanation of being does not have to be actualized in the understanding of a conscious mind because it would be sufficient for such an explanation to remain merely potential. Yet, even if the ultimate explanation of the world is not actualized, it must, by virtue of being an explanation, still be actualizable. That is to say, even if it is not conceived by a conscious mind, it must still be conceivable by some actually existing conscious mind. For just as a hand that cannot be connected to a body is not truly a hand, an explanation that cannot be conceived is not truly an explanation. Epistemic explanations, like semantic meanings, are fundamentally relational. Therefore, there exists a conscious mind that is able to conceive and thereby actualize the ultimate explanation of the world. As argued above, the ultimate explanation is self-evident in an absolute sense. Otherwise, it is not an ultimate explanation. But how can said mind be able to grasp or comprehend something as self-evident in an absolute sense? It is only able to understand something as self-evident in an absolute sense if it is an absolute mind having an absolute perspective. Again, it follows that God exists.
An improvement
It's important to point out that I can further improve my argument by limiting myself to the mere metaphysical possibility of there being a conscious being that conceives of the ultimate explanation as being self-evident. Let me explain. If an explanation is truly self-evident, then it’s reasonable to hold that it must at least be metaphysically possibly conceivable as being indeed self-evident. If it’s metaphysically impossible for that explanation to be conceived as being self-evident, it’s not genuinely self-evident. Being at least possibly conceived as being self-evident seems to be part of the very nature of self-evidence. Being self-evident refers to a reflextive stance towards its content. This line of reasoning is indeed already sufficient for my argument. For only a possible absolute being having an absolute perspective would be able to conceive of the absolute self-evident explanation of the world as being absolutely self-evident. So it follows that there exists possibly an absolute mind having an absolute perspective. There is in other words a possible world in which such an absolute being exists. Since this absolute mind is not dependent on anything else for its existence and thus uncaused, it exists in all possible worlds - including the actual world. So this absolute being actually exists. Hence it follows again that God exists.
Dialectical implications
The first premise of my argument is the non-bruteness premise. One may reject this premise, of course. That is to say, one may not accept that there must be some ultimate explanation of the world. That is why I have called my argument the argument from non-bruteness. The argument shows that to the extent that it is plausible that there is an ultimate explanation for why this world exists, it is plausible that God exists. And many do believe that there is plausibly some ultimate explanation of the world. What my argument shows is that if there is some ultimate explanation of reality, it follows that theism is true. Thus, the argument effectively rules out non-theistic ultimate explanations. Therefore, if my argument is successful, then the atheist has to maintain that there is no ultimate explanation of the world - which for many atheists may not be a desirable position to be in.
The argument and world-for-us epistemology
Those who are familiar with my world-for-us epistemology may wonder how my new argument relates to it. On my theory of knowledge we are doing metaphysics within the-world-for-us. So, all our claims are always already claims within the-world-for-us. The-world-in-itself is for us inescapably unknowable. This is the first sense of saying that the absolute is unknowable. We will never be able to transcend the-world-for-us. We will never be able to grasp the-world-in-itself. We inevitably do all our projects, including metaphysics, within the-world-for-us. Hence, a successful metaphysical argument for God’s existence leads us towards a God within the-world-for-us. That is to say, it leads us towards a God-for-us. For, again, such an argument doesn’t give us any insight in the-world-in-itself.
Normally I don’t refer to this meta-epistemic level and just engage in doing metaphysics. Now, I maintain that the claim that there must be some absolute self-evident ultimate explanation of the world is justified (and thus only justified) as a claim about or within the-world-for-us. It’s a claim internal to the-world-for-us. For it’s not justified as a claim about the-world-in-itself.
Moreover, the claim that we are not able to access this absolute self-evident ultimate explanation is also only justified as a claim about or within the-world-for-us. This is the second sense of saying that we cannot know the absolute. The second sense refers to a characteristic within the-world-for-us, whereas the first sense refers to the interplay between the-world-for-us and the-world-in-itself.
There are good arguments for God’s existence within the-world-for-us. So within the-world-for-us we can know that God exists. And God is within the-world-for-us of course not to be equated with the absolute self-evident ultimate explanation. God is not some absolute self-evident truth. Indeed, God is a conscious being in the-world-for-us that is the first cause of everything in the-world-for-us. Thus God is, of course, not equal to the ultimate absolute self-evident explanation in the-world-for-us. Conscious beings may know explanations, but are not themselves explanations. Hence, there’s no contradiction between my new argument and my world-for-us epistemology. The three claims below can all be coherently affirmed simultaneously.
1. We cannot know anything about the-world-in-itself (i.e., the first sense of saying that the absolute is unknowable).
2. The proposition “There is an ultimate absolute self-evident explanation of the world and we are not able to know this explanation” is justified as a claim about or within the-world-for-us (i.e., the second sense of saying that the absolute is unknowable).
3. The proposition “God exists” is justified as a claim about or within the-world-for-us.
It’s an interesting question within the-world-for-us how the ultimate absolute self-evident explanation of the world within the-world-for-us relates to God within the-world-for-us. With respect to how things are within the-world-for-us, my new argument suggests not only that God knows the ultimate absolute self-evident explanation of the world, but it also suggests that the mere fact that this explanation exists necessitates God’s existence, even without considering the specific content of the explanation. Of course, in this case, the specific content of the absolute ultimate explanation of the world also has to entail Gods existence.
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regress-of-explanation-ender,
theism
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