Strong and weak contingents

Let me split the class of contingents. A contingent thing is strongly contingent if it allows for near alternatives. A contingent thing is weakly contingent if it is not strongly contingent. So, an apple is strongly contingent since we can conceive of different apples that closely resemble it. If consciousness is contingent, then it is weakly contingent since nothing closely resembles it. Suppose that the origin of reality is contingent. Is it then strongly or weakly contingent?

Take again an apple. Now, there are near alternatives for this apple conceivable: a red instead of a green apple, a smaller or larger apple, an apple having a different shape. And so on. These variances are conceivable. It’s not even required to actually see other apples. That’s why an apple is strongly contingent. It’s not just contingent. It also allows for near alternatives. The origin of reality is indeed weakly contingent. Why? Well, it needs to be a regress of explanations ender. Therefore, it needs to be self-explanatory. But then it cannot have near alternatives. This gives us a good reason to consider consciousness as the origin of reality. For consciousness seems the only candidate for a causally efficacious entity that is weakly contingent.