Posts tonen met het label world-for-us-epistemology. Alle posts tonen
Posts tonen met het label world-for-us-epistemology. Alle posts tonen
dinsdag 9 april 2024
Metaphysical idealism refuted
When we think of something outside of thought, we turn it into a thought. From this it follows according to the metaphysical idealist that it is impossible to think of something outside of thought, so that it is impossible that there is something outside of thought. But it is not impossible to think of something outside of thought. This reason for this is that the proposition [There might exist something outside of thought] is epistemically justified and thus meaningful for us. In fact, the logically stronger proposition [There exists something outside of thought] is also epistemically justified and thus meaningful for us. For we cannot else but believe that there exists something outside of thought. Indeed, it would be self-deceiving for anyone to maintain that there exists nothing outside of that person's thought. Both propositions though are not epistemically justified as propositions about how the world is in itself. For we cannot know anything about the absolute. Moreover, even if it would be impossible to think of something outside of thought, it does not follow that there is nothing outside of thought. For why should the world in itself be thinkable? Did the metaphysical idealist travel to the absolute to find out that the absolute is such that the unthinkable is impossible? Of course not. For again, we cannot know anything about the nature of the world as it is in itself. We remain for ever firmly within the realm of the 'for us'.
When we think of something outside of thought, we turn it into a thought. From this it follows according to the metaphysical idealist that it is impossible to think of something outside of thought, so that it is impossible that there is something outside of thought. But it is not impossible to think of something outside of thought. This reason for this is that the proposition [There might exist something outside of thought] is epistemically justified and thus meaningful for us. In fact, the logically stronger proposition [There exists something outside of thought] is also epistemically justified and thus meaningful for us. For we cannot else but believe that there exists something outside of thought. Indeed, it would be self-deceiving for anyone to maintain that there exists nothing outside of that person's thought. Both propositions though are not epistemically justified as propositions about how the world is in itself. For we cannot know anything about the absolute. Moreover, even if it would be impossible to think of something outside of thought, it does not follow that there is nothing outside of thought. For why should the world in itself be thinkable? Did the metaphysical idealist travel to the absolute to find out that the absolute is such that the unthinkable is impossible? Of course not. For again, we cannot know anything about the nature of the world as it is in itself. We remain for ever firmly within the realm of the 'for us'.
zondag 13 november 2022
Inability and the absolute
We cannot know whether our theories adequately describe the absolute. For we cannot know whether the very act of our thinking (or perceiving) always already transforms each thought (or experience) to such an extent that the transformed result radically differs from the absolute. And no, this is not Kantianism. Quite to the contrary. It’s an integral thesis of my world-for-us epistemology as outlined in e.g. my book Contra Kant. For Kant incoherently claims to know precisely how our human cognitive faculties operate from an absolute perspective. But it’s precisely our inherent inability to know this that grounds our lack of knowledge of the absolute. Kant was hopelessly mistaken to ground our lack of knowledge of the absolute in a detailed complex affirmative theory of knowledge that is supposed to be absolutely true and that involves all kinds of forms of perception, categories of thought and ideas of reason - whereas our inability to know the absolute is simply grounded in our inability to know whether our cognitive faculties act or do not act transformatively on the absolute. That’s why, contra Kant, we should never assert anything about the nature of the relationship between the ‘for us’ and the ‘in itself’. For doing so limits the ‘for us’. It subsumes the ‘for us’ under the nature of that relationship, while the ‘for us’ is for us all-encompassing.
But isn't the 'for us' the relationship between an 'us in itself' and the 'in itself'? This might be true, but even if so, it's unknowable to us. The ‘for us’ is what I call in my theory of knowledge the world as it is for us. It’s the world as it is thought and experienced by us. We are thrown in the-world-for-us and how it relates to the-world-in-itself forever escapes us. Since it’s impossible for us to know the ‘in itself’, it’s also impossible for us to know whether what we call the ‘for us’ is or is not the relationship between an ‘us in itself’ and the ‘in itself’. This might be so, but we shall never know. For we cannot escape the ‘for us’. That’s why on my world-for-us theory of knowledge we refrain from any claim about the true ontological nature of the ‘for us’. We do all our projects, including science and metaphysics, firmly within the ‘for us’ without saying anything about its true nature. The ‘for us’ is for us magical.
The consequences are immense. For if we accept that we cannot escape the ‘for us’, so that all our projects - including metaphysics - are firmly performed from within the ‘for us’, then broadly accepted human intuitions become an epistemically legitimate part of metaphysics.
But isn't the 'for us' the relationship between an 'us in itself' and the 'in itself'? This might be true, but even if so, it's unknowable to us. The ‘for us’ is what I call in my theory of knowledge the world as it is for us. It’s the world as it is thought and experienced by us. We are thrown in the-world-for-us and how it relates to the-world-in-itself forever escapes us. Since it’s impossible for us to know the ‘in itself’, it’s also impossible for us to know whether what we call the ‘for us’ is or is not the relationship between an ‘us in itself’ and the ‘in itself’. This might be so, but we shall never know. For we cannot escape the ‘for us’. That’s why on my world-for-us theory of knowledge we refrain from any claim about the true ontological nature of the ‘for us’. We do all our projects, including science and metaphysics, firmly within the ‘for us’ without saying anything about its true nature. The ‘for us’ is for us magical.
The consequences are immense. For if we accept that we cannot escape the ‘for us’, so that all our projects - including metaphysics - are firmly performed from within the ‘for us’, then broadly accepted human intuitions become an epistemically legitimate part of metaphysics.
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