A class of causal principles

Take the principle that an infinite regress of causes is impossible. It's an instance of a class of principles Pt := 'An infinite regress of t-causes is impossible' where t stands for simpliciter, efficient, sustaining, composite and so on. For each t we can ask whether Pt holds. If Pt holds for some t, and if t is not equal to 'simpliciter', then all t-causal series are finite and have a first member. But this first member might not be uncaused. For it might have an s-cause where s is not equal to t.

Speculative Realism and First Causes

According to Tristan Garcia each thing is constituted by the relation between that-which-is-in-the-thing and that-in-which-the-thing is. That is to say, each thing is constituted by the relation between its components and its environment. But then things are partially constituted by their environment. From this is follows that a first cause cannot exist. For, a first cause is the (in)direct cause of its environment and therefore not partially constituted by it.

Markus Gabriel has it that to exist is to exist in a context. This entails as well that a first cause does not exist. For if there is a first cause, it exists in some context. This context is caused by the first cause. At the same time the context must be ontologically prior to the first cause, since without this context the first cause doesn't exist. But this is impossible, since nothing is ontologically prior to its cause.

Are Garcia's and Gabriel's ontological claims about the nature of thinghood convincing? If so, interesting arguments from speculative realism against the existence of a first cause are obtained. It seems to me though that both ontologies face serious problems. Some of these I have disucssed elsewhere. And I will continue to do so.

From God's possible to God's necessary existence

It seems reasonable to define God as a conscious being that is the first cause of reality. Being the first cause, God is uncaused. Suppose that God possibly exists. In that case there is a possible world w in which God exists. According to Leibniz's weak principle of sufficient reason (wPSR) there must be a sufficient reason for every thing that exists.* So, following this principle, there must be a reason in w for Gods existence. God exists in w either by virtue of its own nature, or due to an external cause. Since God is uncaused in w it follows that God exists by virtue of its own nature in w. That is to say, God exists necessarily in w. But then, assuming S5 modal logic, it follows that God exists in all possible worlds. So God exists necessarily. Therefore, given wPSR and S5, Gods possible existence entails Gods necessary existence.

(*) Note that this is indeed a weak version of Leibniz' principle, since it is not claimed that there is a sufficient reason for each fact or state of affairs. It is "merely" claimed that every existing thing (i.e., object or entity) has a reason for its existence.