UvA Seminar on my Semantic Argument

The Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) of the University of Amsterdam (UvA) organizes a seminar on my new semantic argument. The seminar is entitled "There are No Positive Universally Held Contingent Properties" and will take place at Friday 19 February from 16:00u till 17:30u in ILLC Seminar Room F1.15 at the ILLC building on Science Park 107 in Amsterdam. This building is right behind the building of Amsterdam University College at Science Park 113. Everyone is welcome!

Het semantisch argument

Wat nu als het de semantische structuur van de taal zelf is, die ons de weg wijst naar het absolute? Vandaag verdedigde ik mijn semantisch argument contra o.a. het naturalisme bij de onderzoeksgroep van Herman Philipse (en Fred Muller). ‪Het was een hele mooie middag met een gezellige borrel na afloop. Ik ontving uitstekende scherpe feedback op mijn argument. Speciale dank aan twee van de drie aanwezige Hermans (you know who you are) en Wouter. Al het ontvangen commentaar neem ik mee in de finale versie.

VU Seminar on Speculative Realism

This year I shall teach a VU course on Speculative Realism. Speculative Realism is a growing and fascinating movement within contemporary philosophy. The course has the form of a seminar. Below I provide a short outline of its contents. Those interested in attending can contact me for further information.

Post-Kantian critical philosophy has focused almost exclusively on discourse and consciousness as what constitutes reality. Reality appeared only as the correlate of language or thought. Yet, in recent years one can detect a new development within philosophical thought. By contrast with the focus of post-Kantian critical philosophy on discourse and consciousness, a number of philosophers within the existential and phenomenological tradition turned again towards reality in itself. This movement is known as Speculative Realism.

The adjective speculative might suggest a return to pre-Kantian dogmatic philosophy. This is however not the case. Speculative realist thinkers purport to think reality in itself again, without falling back to pre-critical unreflective thought.

Speculative realists share a strong resistance to post-Kantian philosophies of human finitude. They reject the Kantian idea that we only have access to the correlation or interplay between thinking and being, and never to one of them considered apart from the other.

Further, these thinkers want to overcome the Kantian presumption that our human access to reality is somehow privileged. The target of philosophical reflection is thus shifted away again from the thought-world correlate.

Apart from these commonalities, there are important differences between leading speculative realists. Core members within speculative realism are Quentin Meillassoux (defending speculative materialism), Graham Harman and Levy Bryant (defending object oriented ontology), and Tristan Garcia (defending a flat ontology).

The objective of the seminar is to gain clear insight into the various positions within speculative realism and to be able to critically assess and compare these views. We shall explore together a number of fundamental texts that are generally considered to be representative of speculative realist thought and which founded the school of speculative realism. Participants are expected to actively participate by contributing to the discussion and giving a talk.

Literature includes (but is not limited to) selected chapters from After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency by Quentin Meillassoux; 'The Current State of Speculative Realism’ in Speculations, ‘Meillassoux’s Virtual Future’ in Continent, and ‘The Road to Objects’ in Continent by Graham Harman; selected essays from The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman; and selected chapters from Form and Object: A Treatise on Things by Tristan Garcia.

Seminar: Metametaphysics

Metaphysics asks questions about the nature of reality. Examples include: What is causation? Do numbers exist? Do properties exist? Do the past and the future exist? How do things persist through changes of parts? What is the relationship between mind and body? Do we have free will? And so on. Metametaphysics on the other hand is concerned with the nature of metaphysics. It asks questions about the foundations of metaphysics, such as: Is metaphysics possible? Are metaphysical disputes just a matter of how we use words? Or do metaphysical questions have determinate answers? What are proper methods of metaphysics? And so forth. In recent years metametaphysical questions have received considerable attention. In the upcoming weeks I shall teach a VU course on metametaphysics. It will have the form of a seminar. We study and reflect together on recent work in this growing area of debate within analytical philosophy. Students are expected to actively participate by contributing to the discussion. The objective is to gain clear insight into the various positions in the current debate on the foundations of metaphysics and being able to critically assess these views. Literature includes 'David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)', 'Rudolph Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950):20-40' and 'Willard van Orman Quine, “On What There Is,” Review of Metaphysics 2 (1948):21-36'. I am considering to open this seminar for other interested parties. Those interested can email me for further information.