In what follows, I present a refined version of my recently developed argument for God's existence from non-bruteness. The argument deploys possible worlds. Possible worlds represent different ways the world could have been, encompassing all variations of how reality might manifest. Each possible world w has a fundamental metaphysical structure, denoted by S(w), and two possible worlds can share the same fundamental structure. Possible world w1 is accessible from possible world w2 if and only if there exists a relation between w1 and w2 such that any state in w1 can be accessed from w2. I assume that accessibility is a symmetric relation, meaning that if possible world w1 is accessible from possible world w2, then w2 is equally accessible from w1.
Perspectives refer to the points of view or standpoints from which a possible world can be experienced or understood from within. They encode cognitive capabilities and epistemic positions. Let M be a function that maps each possible world to a set of perspectives accommodated by that world. A possible world w accommodating perspective P does not necessitate the existence of an individual in w adopting P. Moreover, the same perspective can figure or be present in multiple possible worlds, necessitating a notion of identity of perspectives across possible worlds. I assume the existence of an adequate notion of transworld identity of perspectives. Thus, some essential feature or set of features of perspectives allows the same perspective to exist across different possible worlds. Traditionally, transworld identity addresses the question of whether an entity or structure in one possible world is the same in another. Transworld identity of perspectives is closely related to that of entities and structures. A perspective in a possible world can be either unlimited or limited. An unlimited perspective in a possible world is an unrestricted, all-encompassing viewpoint, allowing a complete understanding of all aspects of that world. For example, the human perspective in this world is reasonably a limited perspective.
A proposition can only be self-evident if it can possibly be recognized as such. This necessitates the following conceptual analysis of self-evidence. A proposition p is self-evident in possible world w from perspective P if and only if P is in M(w) and in every possible world w' that is accessible from w, and that is sufficiently similar to w (i.e., is such that M(w')=M(w) and S(w')=S(w)), an individual adopting perspective P in w' and contemplating p immediately recognizes it as true without the need for further explanation, while there is at least one possible world w'' accessible from w and sufficiently similar to w in which an individual exists who adopts perspective P in w''. The clause requiring that there must be an accessible and sufficiently similar possible world in which the relevant perspective is adopted, prevents a proposition from being self-evident merely because there is no accessible and sufficiently similar possible world in which the perspective in question is adopted. This clause thus avoids a misguided conception of self-evidence. The relation E(p,w,P) denotes that p is self-evident in w from perspective P.
Let S be the fundamental structure of the actual world a. The core premise of my argument asserts that it is not a brute fact that S is the fundamental structure of a; hence, there must exist an ultimate reason in a for S being the fundamental structure, denoted by proposition r. As an ultimate reason, r not only renders it likely that S is the fundamental structure but also entails that S is the fundamental structure. Proposition r, as an ultimate reason, must terminate any regress of explanations. Therefore, there is an unlimited perspective U in a such that E(r,a,U).
According to the definition of self-evidence, there exists a possible world w2, accessible from the actual world, such that S(w2)=S(a)=S, and there exists an individual i in w2 who has perspective U in w2 and contemplates r, immediately recognizing r as true without the need for further explanation. This means that individual i recognizes E(r,w2,U). Additionally, i recognizes that r entails S is the fundamental structure. Hence, i recognizes r as the ultimate reason for S being the fundamental structure.
Individual i has an unlimited and therefore wholly independent or absolute perspective in w2. Hence, specifically, i is uncaused and thus exists by virtue of its own nature in w2. It follows that i exists necessarily in w2. Therefore, i exists in all possible worlds accessible from w2, including the sufficiently similar actual world. Thus, there is an individual in the actual world with an unlimited perspective, who is uncaused or first, and who recognizes r as self-evident and as being the ultimate reason for S being the fundamental structure.
A proposition p is self-evident in an absolute sense if and only if for all possible worlds w, there exists an unlimited perspective P in w such that E(p,w,P). Now, r must be self-evident in an absolute sense. I will demonstrate this. If r were not self-evident in an absolute sense, there would exist a possible world w* in which there is no unlimited perspective U* such that E(r,w*,U*). If the fundamental structure of w* differs from S, an additional explanation for S being the actual fundamental structure would be necessary — namely, why w* is not actual, thereby preventing S from being the actual fundamental structure. This contradicts r terminating the regress of explanations. If the fundamental structure of w* is S, it still follows that if w* were actual, r would not terminate the regress of explanations due to a lack of an unlimited perspective U* in w* such that E(r,w*,U*). Again, an additional explanation of why w* is not actual would be required, preventing r from being an ultimate reason.
Thus, there exists an individual in the actual world with an absolute perspective, who is uncaused or first, who recognizes r as self-evident in an absolute sense, and who also recognizes r as the ultimate reason for S being the fundamental structure of the world. Given parsimonious considerations, we may reasonably assume there is one such individual unless there are good reasons to believe otherwise. This individual is properly referred to as God. Hence, God exists.
The first premise of my argument is the non-bruteness premise. One may reject this premise, of course. That is to say, one may not accept that there must be some ultimate explanation of why the world has the fundamental structure it has. Yet, the argument shows that to the extent it is plausible that there is such an ultimate explanation, it is plausible that God exists. Many believe that such an ultimate explanation plausibly exists. What my argument demonstrates is that if there is such an ultimate explanation, theism is true. Thus, the argument effectively rules out non-theistic ultimate explanations of the world's fundamental structure. If my argument is successful, the atheist must maintain that there is no ultimate explanation for why the world has the fundamental structure it has, which for many atheists may not be a desirable position to hold.
In what follows, I present a refined version of my recently developed
Your argument can be used as the conclusion of another, which I call the Argument of Intelligible Everlastingness. It is developed as follows:
BeantwoordenVerwijderenEvery cause is either the cause of another or the cause of itself.
Nothing in the universe can be without being a cause, as otherwise, it would not have a real relationship with the other parts of the universe and would not truly be part of the universe.
The first cause is that which is a cause without being the effect of another cause.
The last effect is that which is an effect without being the cause of another effect.
Now, if there were a last effect, it would exist in the universe since it is an effect, but it could not be without being a cause, as it is in the universe. Therefore, given that every cause is either the cause of another or the cause of itself, and the last effect by definition is not the cause of another effect, it would be the cause of itself. That is, the last effect would be indistinguishable from the first cause and would be both caused by another and not caused by another, which is absurd.
From the impossibility of a last effect, it follows that the universe will never perish.
If the universe can never perish, this is either by its own virtue or by the virtue of another. If it is by its own virtue, its eternal persistence will not depend on a necessary reason, but the universe will itself be the reason for its eternal persistence, which will be as certain as it is an indemonstrable brute fact. However, we have demonstrated by necessary reasons that the universe can never perish. Therefore, the universe is imperishable by the virtue of another and not by its own. Consequently, the universe subsists by the continuous creation of a superior being.
After having posted an elaborate response to the previous version of the argument (response pending), Emanual suggested me to look at this one. It was quite a technical one, but here is my response to this one as well.
BeantwoordenVerwijderenBefore starting with the objections, I would like to ask Emanuel to respect the reader by providing intuitive examples alongside the more technical parts of the argument (intuition pumps as Dennett would call them).
Accessibility issue
The argument relies heavily on the concept of possible worlds and their structural similarities to our actual world. However, from an epistemological standpoint rooted in our world, we should be cautious about making claims that apply across these possible worlds and then assuming they transfer directly to the actual world. Emanuel's reliance on the symmetry between possible worlds, specifically the assumption that M(w′)=M(w)M(w′) = M(w)M(w′)=M(w) and S(w′)=S(w)S(w′) = S(w)S(w′)=S(w), introduces significant problems, particularly when considering the complexities of epistemic logic. These symmetrical relations are not as straightforward as Emanuel suggests, and the assumption that they hold universally can lead to problematic conclusions. The use of possible worlds in this argument could be critiqued as speculative or overly abstract. If possible worlds are not as structurally similar or accessible as the argument assumes, this could undermine the argument’s reliance on their metaphysical properties.
The leaps in reasoning
Emanuel's argument takes several leaps that are not sufficiently justified. For instance, the statement "i recognizes r as the ultimate reason for S being the fundamental structure" does not logically lead to the conclusion that "i has an unlimited perspective." Furthermore, even if we accept that i has an unlimited perspective, it does not necessarily follow that this perspective is wholly independent or absolute. It is conceivable to have an unlimited perspective while still being dependent on other factors. Emanuel assumes that these qualities are inherently connected, but this connection is not demonstrated within the argument.
The ontological argument
Emanuel's statement that "i is uncaused and thus exists by virtue of its own nature in w2. It follows that i exists necessarily in w2. Therefore, i exists in all possible worlds accessible from w2, including the sufficiently similar actual world" essentially introduces an ontological argument for the existence of a necessary being, independent of the earlier discussion on brute facts. This aspect of the argument stands on its own and does not require the complex framework of all those premises leading from the non-brute fact that Emanuel constructs. The rest of the argument about the non-brute fact, then, seems like unnecessary elaboration, much like introducing irrelevant premises to support a conclusion that could be reached more directly.
Sufficient reason vs. brute facts
Emanuel heavily invests in the claim that the ultimate reason must be self-evident in an absolute sense, suggesting that any explanation that does not meet this criterion is insufficient. However, sufficient reason doesn't necessarily require absolute self-evidence beyond reasonable doubt. If an explanation satisfactorily accounts for the structure of the world and terminates the regress of explanations, it serves its purpose without needing to invoke a brute fact. The notion that something must be absolutely self-evident to be the ultimate reason is a higher bar than necessary and does not align with more practical epistemological standards.
BeantwoordenVerwijderenSelf-evidence and perspective
Emanuel's argument hinges on the idea that a proposition is self-evident in an absolute sense if it is recognized as true by an unlimited perspective in every possible world.
"A proposition p is self-evident in an absolute sense if and only if for all possible worlds w, there exists an unlimited perspective P in w such that E(p,w,P). Now, r must be self-evident in an absolute sense. I will demonstrate this. If r were not self-evident in an absolute sense, there would exist a possible world w* in which there is no unlimited perspective U* such that E(r,w*,U*). If the fundamental structure of w* differs from S, an additional explanation for S being the actual fundamental structure would be necessary — namely, why w* is not actual, thereby preventing S from being the actual fundamental structure. This contradicts r terminating the regress of explanations. If the fundamental structure of w* is S, it still follows that if w* were actual, r would not terminate the regress of explanations due to a lack of an unlimited perspective U* in w* such that E(r,w*,U*). Again, an additional explanation of why w* is not actual would be required, preventing r from being an ultimate reason."
The argument states that a proposition is "self-evident in an absolute sense" if, in every possible world, there is an unlimited perspective that recognizes this proposition as true without needing further proof. This concept of self-evidence is crucial to the argument because it underpins the idea that the ultimate reason r for the world's fundamental structure must be universally recognized as true by any being with an unlimited perspective.
Here are a few minor objections:
- The fundamental structure of the actual world S can not be different (is necessary). We don't see a justification for why these could not be the same.
- We could say that all possible worlds provide an ultimate reason, and thus defeating the bruteness qualifier, but that they don't have an ultimate perspective. There is no justification provided for why an ultimate perspective must exists at all.
And here my big objection:
If I accept the claim that r is self-evident in an absolute sense, meaning that it provides the regress ender, then that doesn't require a perspective P or U*. r exists independent from a perspective, because it is self-evident. So the type of perspective specified is just an irrelevant clause added. We don't need E(p,w,P) or E(r,w*,U*), we only need E(p,w) or E(r,w*) to be self-evident. I would even suggest that requiring a specific perspective goes against the definition of self-evident. You could argue that you require specific cognitive capabalities to understand ultimate reason r, but that doesn't make r less self-evident.
The leap to theism
Even if we accept that an ultimate reason exists, it does not necessarily follow that this reason is connected to a personal God or even a being at all. There could be alternative explanations, such as an impersonal force or principle, that serve as the ultimate reason without invoking a deity. This leap from an ultimate reason to theism is not sufficiently justified within the argument and opens the door to non-theistic interpretations that the argument does not adequately address.
In conclusion, while Emanuel's argument is sophisticated and ambitious, it relies on several assumptions that may not hold under scrutiny. The accessibility of possible worlds, the connection between unlimited perspectives and independence, the necessity of self-evidence being tied to a particular perspective, and the leap from an ultimate reason to theism all present significant points of contention.